Teksten understreger vigtigheden af at undersøge ikke blot vælgernes mulighed for at tilskrive ansvar for politiske outcomes, men tilmed muligheden for at reagerer på denne tilskrivelse af ansvar. Muligheden for dette varierer på tværs af demokratiske regimetyper, hvorfor teksten giver et perspektiv på, hvilke demokratiske regimetype, der bedst fremmer electoral accountability og generelt demokratiet. Puzzlen er som de selv beskriver: ‘’Do voters reward or punish incumbents for retrospective performance similarly in different democratic regimes?’’
Central(e) variable: hvad er X og Y, og hvilken sammenhæng argumenteres der for?
X: Demokratisk regimetyper
Y: electoral accountability
Z: sammenhængen betinget af muligheden for at reagere på tilskrivelsen af ansvar i det givne demokratiske regimetype
Definition med henvisning af centrale variable og relevante ord
Electoral accountability: ‘’… the voters’ capacity to reward or sanction incumbents, accountability depends on two sets of conditions: 1) voters’ ability to assign responsibility for performance outcomes to incumbents, and 2) voters’ ability to act upon those assignments of responsibility. If voters know who is responsible but cannot act upon that attribution, accountability is impossible (Hellwig & Samuelt 2007: 68).
Assignment of accountability: whether voters’ can differentiate between political actors and, accordingly,assign policy responsibility (ibid. 2007: 69).
Possibility of acting upon the assignment: the extent to which they give voters the opportunity to act upon their judgements (ibid. 2007: 69).
- Dette er nyt og Hellwig & Samuels bidrag!
Demokratiske regimetyper:
Presidential systems: both branches of government are directly elected and the head of government is not accountable to the legislature (ibid. 2007: 72).
Semi-presidential systems: both branches of government are directly elected, but the head of government (the prime minister) is accountable to the legislature (ibid. 2007: 72).
Parliamentary systems: …those in which no directly elected executive exists (ibid. 2007: 72).
Concurrence: applies to pure presidential regimes only and indicates whether or not the executive and legislative elections occurred simultaneously.
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fx Præsidentielle valg i USA samme år som valg til Senatet og Huset
Cohabitation: occurs only in semi-presidential systems and indicates when the president and prime minister come from different parties that are also not in coalition with each other.
Hvad er de(n) central(e) påstand(e)?
Electoral accountability varierer på tværs af forskellige demokratiske regimetyper pga. at variation i magtdelingen, den elektorale cyklus og sameksistens/cohabitation resulterer i forskellige muligheder for at act upon the assignment of responsibility
Opstiller 4 hypoteser ud fra den antagelse, at magtdelingen, den elektoral cyklus og sameksistens/cohabitation påvirker, hvorvidt vælgeren har mulighed for at reagere på sin tilskrivning af ansvar:
(1) Electoral accountability for the economy is stronger in separation of powers systems than in pure parliamentary systems, ceteris paribus.
(2) In separation of powers systems, electoral accountability is relatively greater in executive compared to legislative elections, ceteris paribus.
(3) In pure presidential systems, electoral accountability is conditional on the electoral cycle: economic voting is stronger under concurrence and weaker under non-concurrence.
(4) In semi-presidential systems, electoral accountability is conditional on the composition of the executive: under unified government, voters assign responsibility to the president and his party and, under cohabitation, voters assign responsibility to the prime minister’s party but not to the president or his party.
Mekanismerne:
Ability to assign og ability to act upon judgement
Vælgere skal kunne have mulighed for 1) at tilskrive ansvar og 2) at reagerer på denne tilskrivning af ansvar ved f.eks. at stemme, dvs. udtrykke sin reaktion over for parten, der er blevet tilskrevet ansvar
2) er central for teksten og afhænger af de demokratiske regimetypers magtdeling, den elektorale cyklus og sameksistens/cohabitation
Mekanismer bag magtdeling, elektoral cyklus og cohabitation
– Disse synes at forstærke muligheden for electoral accountability i 1) regimetyper hvor magten er delt, 2) regimetyper hvor der som følge af denne seperation af magt er både concurrent og non-concurrent valg og i 3) regimetyper hvor cohabitation finder sted (semi-presidentielle systemer).
1) Fordi ‘’…variation in the extent of accountability derives from the fundamental institutional differences between democratic regimes: the separation of origin and survival of branches of government’’ (ibid. 2007: 69).
2) Fordi ‘’The electoral cycle may affect the relative clarity of responsibility indirectly through its direct effect on party-system fragmentation, but it also has a more direct effect. In systems with separate executive and legislative elections, concurrence should enhance and non-concurrence should attenuate electoral accountability. Concurrence not only sharpens the focus on the entire government’s performance, it also gives voters who believe both branches are co-responsible for policy performance the ability to hold both branches to account (ibid. 2007: 70).
3) Fordi ‘’…divided or unified control of the executive in semi-presidential systems give voters distinct opportunities to hold incumbent politicians to account (ibid. 2007: 71).
Kausalmodel
Demokratisk regimetype → electoral accountability
- Betinget af muligheden for at reagerer på skrivelse af ansvar
Centrale argument
Forskellige demokratiske regimetyper/formater er forbundet med forskellige mønstre af electoral accountability. Især variation i magtdeling synes afgørende, fordi denne medfører variationen i elektoral cyklus og muligheden for sameksistens/cohabitation, idet ingen af disse to sidsnænvte er mulige i parlamentariske systemer. Derfor bliver electoral accountability fundet stærkere i presidentielle og semi-præsidentielle systemer. Forskningsmæssigt er pointen at adskille det at tilskrive ansvar til en fx en regering og det at kunne reagere på selvsamme tilskrivelse.
Opsummerende: The authors argue that electoral accountability should thus be highest in systems with separation of powers (presidential systems), where elections for the executive and the legislature are held at the same time.
Empiriske fund